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HANGING TOGETHER:
A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO
TAXING MULTINATIONALS
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah*
“We must, indeed, all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang
separately.”
—Benjamin Franklin,
in the Continental Congress just before signing
the Declaration of Independence, 1776.
I. PROF. KAHN.
 Let me begin with a typical Doug Kahn story.  When I first came to visit
Michigan in the fall of 1998, Doug was away on sabbatical and I was asked
to teach corporate tax in his stead.  I was of course aware that he was an
amazing teacher and moreover that he had an excellent casebook on cor-
porate tax.  I was concerned, however, that his casebook was organized in
a way that was unfamiliar to me, so I approached him with some trepida-
tion to ask whether I could use the one I was used to and had studied
from.  This was the casebook authored by Professor Bernard Wolfman
from Harvard.  Doug replied graciously that of course I could use any
casebook I wanted.  Only later did I realize that Doug and Bernie
Wolfman were on opposite sides of most contested questions in corporate
tax, such as whether corporate-shareholder tax integration was advisable
and whether the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in 1986 was a good
idea.
This was vintage Doug: he is passionately attached to his opinions but
perfectly willing to tolerate dissent and diversity.  I later audited his part-
nership tax class and came to appreciate his amazing teaching style.  I
know of no other professor in the United States who teaches like Doug,
entirely from problem sets that need to be updated every semester.  It is
an amazing effort and for years has largely accounted for the fact that
Michigan students are better prepared to practice tax law from their first
day in the office than are graduates of any other law school in the U.S.
Over the past thirteen years, Doug has been the mainstay of the inter-
national tax L.L.M.  For L.L.M. students, getting a good grade in corpo-
rate tax from him was the best ticket to obtaining jobs, and they all
discovered that this one class defined their Michigan experience.  It was
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. I would like to thank
Thomas Pogge, Krishen Mehta, and the participants in the Global Tax Justice seminar at
King’s College, London, for their helpful comments on an earlier version, and Martin
Vallespinos for excellent research assistance. This article is based in part on Reuven Avi-
Yonah, Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals, in GLOBAL
TAX FAIRNESS (Thomas Pogge and Krishen Mehta eds. 2016) (reproduced by permission of
Oxford University Press).
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the hardest but most rewarding class they ever took, and for many of them
it led to jobs at the best law firms in New York City or Silicon Valley (the
two places you can take the bar without a U.S. J.D.).  I am very grateful to
Doug for making this possible.  I am also grateful for him on behalf of the
generations of Michigan J.D. students he taught over the past fifty years,
including Phil Adams, who takes over the burden of teaching the L.L.M.
students.  Thank you Doug!
II. INTRODUCTION
 The recent revelation that many multinational enterprises (MNEs) pay
very little tax to the countries they operate in has led to various proposals
to change the ways they are taxed.  Most of these proposals, however, do
not address the fundamental flaws in the international tax regime that al-
low companies like Apple or Starbucks to legally avoid taxation.  In par-
ticular, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) has been working on a Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
project and is supposed to make recommendations to the G20, but it is not
clear yet whether this will result in a meaningful advance toward prevent-
ing BEPS.1  This article will advance a simple proposal that would allow
OECD member countries to tax MNEs based in those countries without
impeding their competitiveness.  The key observation is that in the twenty-
first century unilateral approaches to tax corporations whose operations
span the globe are obsolete, and a multilateral approach is both essential
and feasible.
The article is divided into five parts.  Part III addresses the fundamen-
tal question of why corporations should be taxed at all, and what are the
implications for taxing MNEs.  Part IV advances a proposal to tax MNEs
at a reduced rate on all of their global profits on a current basis and out-
lines some of the advantages from such an outcome.  Part V responds to
some of the common critiques against this proposal and evaluates it in
comparison with alternative proposals.  Part VI addresses the implications
of the proposal for developing countries.  Part VII concludes by evaluating
the likelihood that such a proposal may be adopted.
III. WHY TAX MULTINATIONALS?
Before we address the issue of how to tax multinationals, it is impor-
tant to address the basic normative issue of why corporations should be
taxed at all.  While the corporate income tax has been a feature of tax
regimes around the world for over a century,2 a prevalent view among tax
1. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], Action Plan on Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (July 19, 2013) [hereinafter OECD Action Plan], http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/9789264202719-en.
2. See REUVEN AVI-YONAH, NICOLA SARTORI & OMRI MARIAN, GLOBAL PERSPEC-
TIVE ON INCOME TAXATION LAW 113 (2011).
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academics is that there is no good reason to tax corporations at all.3  The
main argument against taxing corporations or other legal entities is that
the burden of all taxation ultimately falls on individuals4 and that because
of the uncertainty involved in establishing which individuals bear the bur-
den of the corporate tax, ordinary voters are misled into thinking the tax
does not fall on them.5  This uncertainty makes the corporate tax popular
among politicians, because they can benefit from the fiscal illusion that its
burden falls on the corporation while in reality it is imposed on the voters.
It would be better and more transparent not to tax legal entities at all.6  In
addition, the revenue from the existing corporate tax is relatively low in
OECD member countries (typically less than ten percent of total reve-
nue)7 and it can easily be replaced by raising individual taxes by a small
amount.  Finally, the corporate tax is very complicated and the transaction
costs of trying to avoid it impose significant losses on the economy.8
These arguments strike me as facially persuasive, despite the political
unlikelihood of the corporate tax being abolished anytime soon (precisely
because of the fiscal illusion mentioned above, which renders it politically
popular).  But there are three reasons why the corporate tax should never-
theless be retained, and they are particularly relevant to taxing
multinationals.9
First, while the corporate tax is a relatively unimportant source of reve-
nue in OECD countries, this has generally not been true in developing
countries, where it frequently amounts to over twenty–five percent of total
revenues.10  Because developing countries find it very difficult to collect
the individual income tax, taxing multinationals is crucial for them because
3. See Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to New Corporate Income Tax
Advocacy, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 591, 595 (2008). See also John Hughes, Corporate Income
Tax in O’Neill’s Sights; Treasury Secretary Hopes to End Levy, WASH. POST, May 20, 2001, at
A7.
4. See Arnold C. Harberger, Corporation Tax Incidence: Reflections on What Is
Known, Unknown, and Unknowable, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES AND
IMPLICATIONS 283 (John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2006).
5. Richard M. Bird, Why Tax Corporations? 2-3 (Technical Comm. on Bus. Taxation,
Working Paper No. 96-2, 1996).
6. N. Gregory Mankiw, How to Fix the Corporate Tax? Repeal It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 2014, at N7.
7. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: INTERNATIONAL COM-
PARISONS 13, tbl.2-1 (2005) (citing ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., REVENUE
STATISTICS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES tbl.12 (2004)).
8. Joel B. Slemrod & Marsha Blumenthal, The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big
Business, 24 PUB. FIN. Q. 411 (1996). See also Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corpo-
rate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775, 1780 (1999); George K. Yin, Getting Serious About
Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson From History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209 (2001).
9. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193 (2004).
10. See generally Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Taxpayer Responses to Com-
petitive Tax Policies and Tax Policy Responses to Competitive Taxpayers: Recent Evidence, 34
TAX NOTES INT’L 1349 (2004).
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otherwise they would have to rely entirely on the regressive Value Added
Tax (VAT).11  From the perspective of a developing country the uncer-
tainty regarding the incidence of the corporate tax is less important be-
cause some of the likely bearers of the burden (providers of capital and
consumers) are residents of other countries.  Moreover, even if one
presumes that the corporate tax falls on labor in the developing country,
taxing the multinational may be a more efficient way of collecting reve-
nues than attempting to tax individual workers.  Finally, in the case of mul-
tinationals in developing countries, a lot of the corporate profit may be
rents for the exploitation of country-specific resources and that is an effi-
cient tax for the country to impose.  These issues are explored more fully
in Part IV below.
Second, it has long been observed that the corporate tax is an impor-
tant backstop for the progressivity of individual tax because, in the ab-
sence of the corporate tax, rich individuals would be able to park their
money in corporations and obtain indefinite deferral (i.e., not pay tax until
there is a dividend distribution or a sale of the shares).12  In the case of
privately held entities, it is possible to overcome this problem by treating
these entities as pass-through entities and currently taxing their owners on
the income earned by the entity.13  But this solution will not work for pub-
licly traded entities like multinationals because of the difficulty of estab-
lishing who their shareholders are at any given moment.14  It may still be
possible to tax shareholders of publicly traded entities on the market value
of their shares because in that context there are no valuation issues (the
price is established by the trading) and no liquidity issues (it is easy to sell
the shares to pay the tax).15  But a discrepancy frequently exists between
the market value and the underlying earnings, and because the stock mar-
ket fluctuates for reasons unrelated to the performance of any given cor-
poration, taxing share values is not an accurate way of defeating deferral.
In addition, mark-to-market taxation is very unpopular because of the un-
certainty inherent in taxing unrealized income (if the shares fall in value, it
is unclear whether the taxpayer can use the loss to recover the tax paid).16
Thus, in the case of publicly traded entities, the corporate tax is still a way
to make sure that rich individuals are not able to reduce their effective tax
rate by delaying the payment of tax until a dividend is distributed.17
11. See Bird, supra note 5.
12. See id. at 9.
13. Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1205; George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private
Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 141, 153–54 (1999).
14. See generally Anthony P. Polito, A Proposal for an Integrated Income Tax, 12
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1009 (1989).
15. Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-
Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 269 (1995).
16. Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REV.
355, 392–96 (2004).
17. I do not take a position here on the question of whether shareholders should be
given relief from double taxation by adopting some method of integrating the corporate and
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Third, corporations are such important actors in any modern economy
that the ability to regulate their behavior is crucial to achieving economic
goals,18 and the corporate tax has since its inception been seen as an im-
portant vehicle to regulate corporate behavior.19  The tax can provide dis-
incentives for behavior the legislator deems to be undesirable (e.g., paying
bribes or participating in boycotts) and incentives for desirable behavior
(investments incentives, hiring incentives, clean energy incentives, etc.).
Much of the complexity of the corporate tax stems from these tax expendi-
tures.  Some of these goals can perhaps be accomplished by direct regula-
tion and some by paying subsidies.  But there are cases where tax is a more
effective vehicle for regulation than either command-and-control regula-
tion or subsidies (e.g., a carbon tax versus cap and trade to reduce global
climate change).20
These three reasons all support taxation of multinationals.  In the case
of developing countries, the domestic corporate tax base is usually quite
limited and most of the revenue stems from taxing foreign multinationals.
The individual deferral argument suggests that multinationals should be
taxed because if they are not, rich individuals can invest specifically in
multinationals and obtain the same benefit as if there was no corporate
tax.  The regulatory argument also supports taxing multinationals because
while some regulatory aims can be achieved just by taxing domestic activi-
ties, others (e.g., curbing pollution, bribery, or child labor) require a global
focus on all the activities of the multinational.
These arguments also support adopting a multilateral approach to tax-
ing multinationals.  If a residence country adopts global taxation unilater-
ally, its rich residents can still defer taxation by investing in multinationals
based in other countries, and these multinationals can also escape the resi-
dence country’s regulatory reach.  But if a multilateral approach is
adopted, neither of these avenues of avoiding taxation remains open.
IV. TAXING MULTINATIONALS ON GLOBAL PROFITS:
A MULTILATERAL APPROACH
Having established that multinationals should be subject to tax, the
next question is how to tax them.  The current approach is for each coun-
try to generally tax only the portion of the multinational that is located
within it, and to permit exemption or at least deferral for foreign source
profits.  This approach is widely seen as conducive to massive tax avoid-
shareholder tax because the commonly applied methods of integration do not affect the cor-
porate level tax. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir Chenchiski, The Case for Divi-
dend Deduction, 65 TAX LAW. 3 (2011) (discussing corporation-shareholder integration).
18. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1231–42.
19. See A.C. PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1938). See also Williams, J.
Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972).
20. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax, and Other Regula-
tory Taxes, in BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 183, 185–87
(David A. Brennen, Karen B. Brown, & Darryll K. Jones eds., 2013).
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ance.21  In addition, it is inconsistent with the three reasons to tax multina-
tionals outlined in Part III. Taxing multinationals on a country-by-country
basis leads to tax competition,22 which has significantly eroded the ability
of developing countries to collect revenues from multinationals.23  Permit-
ting exemption or deferral allows rich individuals to delay paying tax on
the income they earn within those portions of the multinational that are
not subject to tax.  And taxation on a territorial basis allows multinationals
to escape regulation by shifting their regulated activities out of the regulat-
ing jurisdiction.24
The proposed solution to taxing multinationals on global profits is this:
each country in which a multinational is resident should tax the profits of
the entire multinational on a current basis, with a credit for taxes paid by
the multinational to foreign (source) jurisdictions up to the level of tax in
the residence jurisdiction.
This approach requires determining the residence jurisdiction of the
multinational.  In most cases, the residence jurisdiction is both where the
multinational is incorporated and where its headquarters are.  However,
because it is relatively easy to shift the location of incorporation, the resi-
dence should be determined by the location of the headquarters.25
The proposed approach treats the multinational in the same way it is
treated for financial reporting purposes: as a single unified enterprise con-
trolled by the parent.  Under twenty-first century conditions this is a much
more realistic approach than taxing each entity separately.  Multinationals
operate as a unitary business in most cases and most decisions are made at
the parent level.
Ignoring the separate incorporation of the multinational’s subsidiaries
is consistent with the ability of the multinational to operate via subsidiar-
ies or branches.  It also leads to significant simplification and eliminates
most of the techniques used by multinationals to avoid the corporate tax.
For example, the OECD has identified hybrid entities and thin capitaliza-
21. See, e.g., Overall Evaluation of the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) Project, THE BEPS MONITORING GROUP (Oct. 5, 2015), https://bepsmonitoring-
group.wordpress.com /2015/10/05/overall-evaluation/.
22. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of
the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575–76 (2000) [hereinafter Welfare State].
23. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization and Tax Competition: Implications for
Developing Countries, LAW QUAD. NOTES, Summer 2001, at 61–62 (having been published
under the same title in 74 CEPAL REV. 59 (2001)) [hereinafter Globalization & Tax
Competition].
24. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Back to the Future? The Potential Revival of Territorial-
ity, 62 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 471, 471–72 (2008) [hereinafter Back to the Future]; Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Territoriality: For and Against 4–5 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 329, 2013/Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-008, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256580.
25. This is a crucial safeguard and therefore countries that currently define corporate
residence in formal terms as country of incorporation or where the board of directors meets
should switch to the UK’s location of headquarters approach.
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tion as two prominent techniques to reduce the corporate effective tax
rates.26  Under the proposed approach, hybrid entities (treated as a branch
by one jurisdiction and as a subsidiary by another) will not exist because
all parts and subsidiaries of the multinational will be treated as a single
entity.  Thin capitalization (capitalizing subsidiaries with debt rather than
equity and deducting the interest from the amount of tax paid) will be
eliminated because dividends, interest, and royalty payments within a mul-
tinational will be ignored for tax purposes.
The proposed approach will also eliminate outbound transfer pricing
because it will ignore transfers of goods and services within a multina-
tional for tax purposes.  Inbound transfer pricing will still exist, but the
incentive to engage in it will be reduced if the profit has to be shifted to
the parent jurisdiction rather than to a tax haven.
Importantly, it is envisaged that the proposed approach will be
adopted on a multilateral basis by the OECD (on the likelihood of this
happening, see Part VII below).  The vast majority of multinationals are
currently resident in OECD member countries.27 Moreover, the corporate
tax rates in most OECD member countries are similar, between twenty
and thirty percent.28  The proposed approach will enable outliers like the
U.S. to reduce their corporate tax rate below thirty percent without losing
revenue.  Other OECD members whose taxes are unusually low, such as
Ireland (12.5%),29 may be able to raise them for domestic resident corpo-
rations without losing investments because multinationals from other
OECD countries will be taxed at a similar rate in their residence country.
Foreign tax credits will be available for taxes paid to source jurisdic-
tions.  In most cases, these taxes will be lower than the tax rate in the
country of residence, even when withholding taxes are taken into account.
Importantly, the proposed solution will significantly reduce the incentive
of developing countries to engage in harmful tax competition, because tax
holidays granted to multinationals will only result in a transfer of revenue
to the country of residence.  Under current conditions, multinationals are
able to pit developing countries one against the other and frequently ob-
tain tax benefits from both.  Given that the multinational will make the
investment in those developing countries absent the tax incentive, this re-
26. See OECD Action Plan, supra note 1, at 15–17.
27. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.,WORLD INVESTMENT RE-
PORT 2000: CROSS BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 75 (2000)
(stating that nearly 90 of the 100 largest transnational companies reside in the European
Union, Japan, or the United States) [hereinafter UN CONFERENCE].
28. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], OECD Tax Database,
Explanatory Annex Part II: Taxation of Corporate and Capital Income (May 2015), http://
www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/Corporate-and-Capital-Income-Tax-Rates-Explanatory-Annex-
May-2015.pdf. Compare id. at 6 (noting Germany’s rate of 20.5%), and id. at 7 (noting
Greece’s rate of 26%), with id. at 17 (noting Netherlands’ rate of either 20% or 25% depend-
ing on taxable income), and id. at 18 (noting Slovak Republic’s rate of 22%).
29. Corporation Tax, REVENUE, IRISH TAX AND CUSTOMS, http://www.revenue.ie/en/
tax/ct/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
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sult is an unjustified windfall.  The above proposal can reduce the pressure
on developing countries to provide tax benefits to multinationals.  See Part
VI below for further discussion of this issue.
The advantage of the proposal for multinationals is the treatment of
losses.  Currently, multinationals are frequently unable to use losses from
foreign operations to offset profits from domestic operations.  Under the
proposal, all such losses will be currently available.
This proposal is of course not new.  It is essentially the approach pro-
posed by the Kennedy administration in 196130 for U.S.-resident multina-
tionals, and it is also the approach used until recently by Brazil.31  The
Kennedy proposals were met by severe criticism and were not adopted,32
and the Brazilian Supreme Court has cut back on the reach of the Brazil-
ian tax on subsidiaries.  In the next Part, I will address these critiques and
show that they are invalid for a multilateral approach.
V. RESPONSE TO COMMON CRITIQUES
 There are three common critiques of the above approach.  First, it is said
that it violates certain economic neutrality norms and is therefore less effi-
cient than territoriality (i.e., each country only taxing the income of the
multinational earned within it).33  Second, adopting the proposed global
approach is said to harm the competitive position of any given country’s
multinationals.34 Third, adopting the proposed approach will provide an
incentive for multinationals to shift their residence to tax havens.35
A. Neutrality
Three types of neutrality arguments apply to cross-border investment.
The two traditional ones are capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital
30. See President’s Tax Message: Hearing on H.R. 10650 Before the Comm. on Ways &
Means, 87th Cong. (1961), reprinted in 1 COMM. OF WAYS & MEANS, 87TH CONG., LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1962, at 141-435 (1967) [hereinafter President’s Tax
Message].
31. BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION 47 (Yariv
Brauner & Pasquale Pistone eds., 2015).
32. See Hearing on H.R. 10650 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 87th Cong., 560–61,
725–26 (1962), reprinted in 3 S. COMM. ON FIN., 87TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1962, at 467–501, 715–24 (1962) (statements by Walter A. Slowinski, Mem-
ber of Comm. of Taxation, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and R. J. Landolt,
Comm. on Fed. Taxation, Controllers Inst. of America); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15
VA. TAX REV. 89, 101–03 (1995) [hereinafter Arm’s Length] (noting that the taxpayers suc-
cessfully lobbied Congress to remove a section that authorized the Secretary of the Treasury
to allocate income between related organizations from the proposed Revenue Act of 1962).
33. See James R. Hines, Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income, 62 TAX L.
REV. 269 (2009).
34. See Ken Kies, A Perfect Experiment: ‘Deferral’ and the U.S. Shipping Industry, 116
TAX NOTES 997 (2007).
35. See DANIEL N.  SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (2014).
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import neutrality (CIN).36  CEN requires neutrality in the location of in-
vestment between the residence and source jurisdictions, and therefore
supports taxing multinationals on a global basis as envisaged above.37
CIN requires neutrality between two different investors in a third jurisdic-
tion (which is assumed to impose no tax) and therefore requires territori-
ality if the other jurisdiction taxes on a territorial basis.38
It is often said that CEN and CIN are mutually incompatible in a world
with different tax rates, and therefore a choice must be made.  Tradition-
ally, CEN was regarded as more important than CIN because investment
locations were shown to be more sensitive to tax rates than the rate of
savings, and CIN affected the rate of savings in each resident jurisdic-
tion.39  But in the current environment where the tax rates of most OECD
countries have converged, if the above multilateral proposal is adopted it
is possible to achieve both CEN and CIN simultaneously.40
A new variant of the neutrality argument is capital ownership neutral-
ity (CON), which focuses on the multinational itself and not on its inves-
tors.41  It is said that multinationals exist because of ownership advantages
that render them more efficient than their competitors.  If one multina-
tional is subject to a higher effective tax rate than a competitor because of
global taxation, then it may be forced to forego an investment in a third
country even if it is the more efficient one.  But if the proposed solution is
adopted on a multilateral basis, then all likely competitors will be taxed in
the same way and CON can be preserved as well.
B. Competitiveness
Historically, the main argument against adopting the Kennedy propo-
sal and similar unilateral proposals is that they would put U.S.-based mul-
tinationals at a competitive disadvantage because multinationals from
other countries are not subject to the same type of rule.42  I have always
found this argument less than persuasive for several reasons: (a) it is not
clear that competitiveness is a meaningful economic concept, or that the
U.S. as a country should care particularly about the competitiveness of
36. PEGGY BREWER RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME 8–10
(1963).
37. DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 122 (2009).
38. Id. at 123–24.
39. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF
INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 25–42 (2000);
STAFF OF U.S. JOINT COMM. OF TAXATION, 102D CONG, PROPOSAL RELATING TO CURRENT
U.S. TAXATION OF CERTAIN OPERATIONS OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND
RELATED ISSUES (Comm. Print 1991).
40. For further elaboration of this point, see Appendix.
41. See Desai A. Mihir & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56
NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003).
42. Revenue Act of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4816–20, 4793–97 (1962) (statements by W. Slowinski and R. Landolt).
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multinationals resident in it (as opposed to the competitiveness of the U.S.
economy as a whole or of its population);43 (b) the same argument was
made in 1961, when U.S.-based multinationals clearly dominated the
globe, yet in more recent years their position was less dominant;44 (c)
there is no evidence that current U.S. rules, which deviate from the global
norm of territoriality and impose tax on some foreign source income of
U.S.-based multinationals, have injured those multinationals in any signifi-
cant way.  In fact, empirical studies suggest that EU-based multinationals
and U.S.-based multinationals pay similar effective tax rates even though
the former benefit from territoriality and the latter do not.45
But even if competitiveness is a valid argument (and it clearly carries
weight among politicians), if a multilateral approach is adopted it loses its
force.  As stated above, over ninety percent of multinationals are resident
in OECD countries46, and the others are mostly resident in large develop-
ing countries that may also be willing to join a multilateral approach.
Under these circumstances, there will be no competitive disadvantage to
any residence country that adopts the global approach unless it stems from
its domestic corporate tax rate.  As suggested above, the U.S. is an outlier
in this regard because its corporate tax rate of thirty-five percent is signifi-
cantly above the OECD average.47  In the context of adopting such a re-
form the U.S. can and should reduce its rate on a revenue-neutral basis.48
C. Corporate Expatriations
The last argument against taxing multinationals on a global basis is that
the tax can be avoided by shifting the residence of the multinational to a
jurisdiction that does not impose such a tax.  In fact, we are currently in
the midst of another wave of “inversions,” or corporate expatriations, out
of the U.S. because of the high corporate tax rate.49
But this argument assumes that there are other jurisdictions that the
multinational can move to.  If all OECD countries adopt the proposal,
most of the likely destinations disappear (again, assuming this is coupled
43. See Jane G. Gravelle, Does the Concept of Competitiveness Have Meaning in For-
mulating Corporate Tax Policy?, 65 TAX L. REV. 323, 347 (2012).
44. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER  & ARIEL ASSA, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., US
TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 4 (2007).
45. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest US
and EU Multinationals, 65 TAX L. REV. 375  (2012)
46. UN CONFERENCE, supra note 27.
47. Compare OECD Action Plan, supra note 1 (describing majority of tax rates as
falling between 20% and 30%), with id. at 19 (noting United States tax rate of 35%).
48. In fact, none of the G20 countries that are the main motivator of the BEPS effort
have a corporate tax rate below 20% and only a few of them have a tax rate above 30%, so
that they could commit to maintain a rate between 20% and 30% with only minimal changes.
See Appendix.
49. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Reflections on the ‘New Wave’ Inversions and Notice
2014–52, 145 TAX NOTES 95 2014). See also Omri Y. Marian, Home-Country Effects of Cor-
porate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 101 (2015) (forthcoming).
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with a reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate).  There are good business
reasons why the headquarters of almost all multinationals are in OECD
countries, and those reasons will militate against a move outside the
OECD.50
A move to a tax haven may be possible if residence is defined as place
of incorporation.  But, as suggested above, corporate residence should be
defined as location of the corporate headquarters, and those are much less
likely to be moveable to tax havens because corporate management is not
likely to want to relocate there and other facilities that usually follow the
headquarters location, such as research and development, cannot easily be
moved there.51  For the same reasons, it is unlikely that new multination-
als can be founded in tax havens outside the OECD and G20 countries.
Thus, it seems that none of the common arguments against taxing mul-
tinationals on a current basis is valid if one assumes that this approach can
be adopted on a multilateral basis.  The key question, discussed in Part
VII, is therefore whether a multilateral approach is realistic.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
What are the implications of this proposal for developing countries?
Specifically, would multilateral action by the OECD to restrict tax compe-
tition help or hurt developing countries?
First, developing countries need tax revenues at least as much as devel-
oped countries do, if not more.52  A common misperception is that only
OECD member countries are confronted by a fiscal crisis as a result of the
increasing numbers of elderly people in the population.  In fact, the in-
crease in dependency ratios (the ratio of the elderly to the working popu-
lation) is expected to take place in other geographic areas as well, as
fertility rates go down and health care improves.53  Outside the OECD
and the transition economies, the dependency ratio starts in the single dig-
its in the 1990s, but rises to just below thirty percent by 2015.54  Moreover,
while outside the OECD and the transition economies direct spending on
social insurance is much lower, other forms of government spending (e.g.,
government employment) effectively fulfill a social insurance role.55  In
Latin America, for example, direct government spending on social insur-
50. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990).
51. See UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment
Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Internalization of the R&D 157–58 (2005).
52. See Globalization & Tax Competition, supra note 23, at 60-65.
53. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, Highlights 61–65 (United Nations
Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.202, 2007), http://www.un
.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/wpp2006.htm.
54. Globalization & Tax Competition, supra note 23, at 60-65.
55. Id.
148 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 5:137
ance is much lower than indirect spending through government employ-
ment and procurement programs.56
Moreover, it seems strange to argue that developing countries need tax
revenues less than developed countries because they have less developed
social insurance programs.  If one accepts the normative case for social
insurance, it applies to developing countries with even greater force be-
cause of widespread poverty, which means that losing a job can have much
direr consequences.57  But the need for revenues in developing countries
goes far beyond social insurance.  In some developing countries revenues
are needed to ensure the very survival of organized government, as the
Russian experience demonstrates.  In other, more stable developing coun-
tries revenues are needed primarily to provide for adequate education (in-
vestment in human capital), which many regard as the key to promoting
development.58  For example, the UN has estimated that for only an addi-
tional $50 billion per year, all people in the world can obtain basic social
services (such as elementary education).  Given current trends in foreign
aid, most of these funds have to come from developing country
governments.59
Second, the standard advice by economists to small open economies is
that they should refrain from taxing foreign investors, because such inves-
tors cannot be made to bear the burden of any tax imposed by the capital-
importing country.60  Therefore, the tax will necessarily be shifted to less
mobile factors in the host country, such as labor or land, and it is more
efficient to tax those factors directly.  But while this argument seems quite
valid as applied to portfolio investment, it seems less valid in regard to
foreign direct investment (FDI), for two reasons.  First, the standard ad-
vice does not apply if a foreign tax credit is available in the home country
of the investor, and this would frequently be the case for FDI.61  Second,
the standard advice assumes that the host country is small.  However, ex-
tensive literature on multinationals suggests that typically they exist in or-
der to earn economic rents.62  In that case, the host country is no longer
“small” in the economic sense.  That is, there is a reason for the investor to
56. See SUBBARAO K. ET AL., SAFETY NET PROGRAMS AND POVERTY REDUCTION:
LESSONS FROM CROSS COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 27 (1997).
57. Human Development Report 1997, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME (1997), http://
hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/258/hdr_1997_en_complete_nostats.pdf.
58. Amartya Sen, Development Thinking at the Beginning of the XXI Century, in ECO-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT INTO THE XXI CENTURY 531 (Louis Emmerij ed., 1997).
59. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Preparatory Com-
mittee for the High-Level International Intergovernmental Event on Financing for Develop-
ment, U.N. DOC A/55/28/Add.1 (2001), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a5528a1.pdf.
60. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax
Harmonization, 37 ECON. LETTERS 69, 69–76 (1991).
61. TIMO VIHERKENTTA, TAX INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION (1991).
62. J. F. Hennart, The Transaction Cost Theory of the Multinational Enterprise, in THE
NATURE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL FIRM (C. Pitelis and R. Sudgen eds., 1991).
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be there and not elsewhere.  Therefore, any tax imposed on such rents (as
long as it is below one hundred percent) will not necessarily drive the in-
vestor to leave even if it is unable to shift the burden of the tax to labor or
landowners.
This argument clearly holds in the case of rents that are linked to a
specific location, such as natural resources or a large market.  But what if
the rent can be earned in a large number of potential locations?63 In that
case, the host country will not be able to tax the rent if the multinational
can credibly threaten to go elsewhere, although once the investment has
been made the rent can be taxed.  This situation, which is probably the
most common, would require coordinated action to enable all host coun-
tries to tax the rent earned within their borders. The proposal outlined
above addresses this issue directly.
This relates to the final argument, which is that host countries need to
offer tax incentives to be competitive.  Extensive literature has demon-
strated that taxes do in fact play a crucial role in determining investment
location decisions.64  But all of these studies emphasize that the tax incen-
tives are crucial given the availability of such incentives elsewhere.65  Thus,
it can be argued that given the need for tax revenues, developing countries
would generally prefer to refrain from granting tax incentives, if only they
could be assured that no other developing country would be able to grant
such incentives.66
Thus, restricting the ability of developing countries to compete in
granting tax incentives does not truly restrict their autonomy or counter
their interests.  That is the case whenever they grant the incentive only for
fear of competition from other developing countries, and would not have
granted it but for such fear.  Whenever competition from other countries
drives the tax incentive, eliminating the competition does not hurt the de-
veloping country, and may aid its revenue-raising efforts (assuming it can
attract investment on other grounds, which is typically the case). Moreo-
ver, under the proposals described above, developing countries remain
free to lower their tax rates generally (as opposed to granting specific tax
relief aimed at foreign investors).
Two additional points need to be made from a developing country per-
spective.  The first concerns the question of tax incidence.  Since the tax
competition that is most relevant to developing countries concerns the cor-
porate income tax, it is important to attempt to assess the incidence of that
63. JOHN H. DUNNING, EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION (1988).
64. See Eric Bond, Tax Holidays and Industrial Behavior 63 REV. ECON. & STAT 88
(1981); Michael J. Boskin & William G. Gale, New Results on the Effects of Tax Policy on the
International Location of Investment, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL ACCUMU-
LATION 201 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1987); see also James R. Hines, Jr., The Flight Paths of
Migratory Corporations, 6 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 447 (1991).
65. STEPHEN E. GUISINGER, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIRE-
MENTS: PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT (1985).
66. Welfare State, supra note 22, at 1645.
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tax in evaluating the effects of collecting it on the welfare of the develop-
ing country.  Unfortunately, after decades of analysis, no consensus exists
on the incidence of the corporate tax.  While older studies tend to con-
clude that shareholders or all capital providers bore the tax, more recent
studies have suggested that, to a significant extent, consumers or laborers
bore the tax.67  Another possibility is that those who were shareholders at
the time the tax was imposed or increased bore the tax on established
corporations, because thereafter it is capitalized into the price of the
shares.  It is unlikely that this debate will be decided any time soon (in
fact, the incidence may be shifting over time, especially as globalization
may enable corporations to shift more of the tax burden to labor).  How-
ever, from the perspective of a developing country deciding whether to
collect taxes from a multinational, three out of the four possible alterna-
tives for incidence (current shareholders or capital providers, old share-
holders, and consumers) are largely the residents of other jurisdictions.
Therefore, from a national welfare perspective, the developing country
gains by collecting the tax.  And even if some of the tax is shifted to labor
in the developing country, one can argue that as a matter of tax adminis-
tration it is more efficient (as well as more politically acceptable) to collect
the tax from the multinational than to attempt to collect it from the
workers.
Finally, it should be noted that a developing country may want to col-
lect taxes from multinationals even if, in general, it believes that the pri-
vate sector is more efficient in using the resources than the public sector.
In the case of a foreign multinational, the taxes that the developing coun-
try fails to collect may indeed be used by the private sector, but in another
jurisdiction, and therefore not benefit the developing country.  One possi-
ble solution, which is in fact employed by developing countries, is to re-
frain from taxing multinationals while they re-invest domestically, but tax
them upon remittance of the profits abroad.  Such taxation of dividends
and other forms of remittance, however, is subject to the same tax compe-
tition problem discussed above.  Thus, it would appear that overcoming
the tax competition problem is in the interest of developing countries in
most cases, and the proposal developed above would seem to be in their
best interest.
VII. CAN THE PROPOSAL BE ADOPTED?
 By this point, I hope the reader will be convinced that (a) current taxa-
tion of all multinationals on a global basis is the preferred approach and
(b) if such taxation can be adopted on a multilateral basis, then all the
usual arguments against its unilateral adoption by any country disappear.
This is an unusual situation because in most tax policy debates, there are
good arguments on either side.  In this case, however, the case in favor of
67. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY (5th ed. 1987).
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multilateral current taxation would seem to be quite convincing, with no
significant drawbacks if it can be achieved.
But, the reader is likely to object, this assumes that a multilateral ap-
proach is possible on such a sensitive issue as taxation.  What is the evi-
dence that this is in fact the case?
In order to assess whether multilateral action is possible, it is first nec-
essary to establish the interests of the parties involved.  Tax competition
for FDI typically involves an MNE deciding which countries are possible
investment locations from a non-tax point of view—that is, taking into
account location, infrastructure, education, political stability, and other
factors.68  Once the MNE has established a list of plausible countries, it
then approaches these countries and asks what they would be willing to
offer it in return for the investment.  The countries then engage in a bid-
ding war to grant tax reductions, culminating in the winner’s receiving the
investment.  Frequently, more than one country is able to get the
investment.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the investment would be
made in any case, whether the tax incentive is granted or not.  The tax
incentives are therefore a pure windfall for the MNE.  If the countries
could find a way to coordinate their approaches, they would still get the
investment but without the tax cost.
Thus, it is in the interest of most countries to coordinate their ap-
proaches to prevent this type of tax competition.  The same rationale holds
true for capital exporting jurisdictions like the large countries in OECD.
They would prefer to tax their MNEs on a current basis, but are con-
strained from doing so because of the competitiveness and expatriation
concerns outlined above.
Thus, in my opinion, all OECD member countries would benefit from
a multilateral approach.  Capital exporting countries could obtain reve-
nues from their MNEs without concerns about harming their competitive-
ness or MNEs migrating to other OECD countries.  Capital importing
countries could obtain FDI without the concern that if they do not grant
tax holidays, the investment would end up in other countries.  In the latter
case, if all OECD and G20 countries were on board, the limits on tax
competition would apply outside the OECD, as well, since almost all
MNEs are based in these countries.  Countries outside the OECD and
G20 would have no incentive to grant tax holidays against their own inter-
est if the income were taxed in the residence country of the MNE, since
there would be no benefit to the MNE from the tax holiday.
In addition, if the proposal above were adopted, it would help alleviate
the current opposition by MNEs and some countries to country-by-coun-
try reporting,69 which is being considered by the OECD as part of the
68. PORTER, supra note 50.
69. See generally ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. DISCUSSION DRAFT ON
TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND CBC REPORTING (2014) (detailing the main con-
cerns of taxpayers, business groups and their advisers about the proposal).
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BEPS project.70  Since MNEs would obtain credit for taxes levied by
source countries under the proposal, they should be less hostile to country-
by-country reporting, which is designed to aid source countries collect
their fair share of taxes.
If the interests of the countries are aligned, what has prevented multi-
lateral action so far?  In my opinion, it is primarily because of lobbying by
the MNEs themselves.  They are the primary beneficiaries from the status
quo and they have successfully lobbied both countries and the OECD
against meaningful reform.
A useful contrast is to examine a case in which the countries and
MNEs were aligned.  Prior to 1977, there were no domestic limits on
MNEs’ paying bribes overseas to obtain contracts from corrupt govern-
ment officials.71  In 1977, following several scandals, the U.S. enacted the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,72 which imposed criminal sanctions on
such bribes by U.S.-based MNEs and their executives.73  Predictably, U.S.
MNEs complained that this ban put them at a competitive disadvantage,
especially when other countries like Germany permitted foreign bribes to
be deducted for domestic tax purposes.74
Somewhat surprisingly, the outcome was not the relaxation of the U.S.
law.  Instead, the Clinton administration successfully pushed the OECD to
adopt the same provisions as part of a binding, multilateral treaty, which
eliminated the competitive disadvantage issue.75
The key reason for this success is that not only were the interests of the
countries aligned, but also the MNEs did not like paying bribes either and
therefore lobbied in favor of the provision.76  This will not be the case for
tax, where the MNEs are already pushing back against the OECD BEPS
project.  However, historically there have been instances of overcoming
resistance by MNEs.  For example, the U.S. Congress in 2010 adopted the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) because of an outcry by
70. See generally OECD Action Plan, supra note 1, at 22; see also ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., GUIDANCE ON TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-
BY-COUNTRY REPORTING (2014).
71. Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929
(2012).
72. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (1982).
73. Steven R. Salbu. Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 230 (1997).
74. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, http://
www.business-anti-corruption.com/about/about-corruption/the-oecd-convention-on-combat-
ing-bribery-of-foreign-public-officials-in-international-business-transactions.aspx (last visited
Mar. 24, 2015); Reuven Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Es-
say on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 5 (2003)
[hereinafter National Regulation].
75. National Regulation, supra note 74.
76. Id.
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civil society over tax evasion despite fierce opposition by the banks,77 and
many countries have been copying that innovative law.  This led the
OECD to propose a Multilateral Agreement on Administrative Assis-
tance in Tax Matters (MAATM), which has been endorsed by over eighty
countries.78
At the current juncture, there is huge pressure on the OECD govern-
ments to do something about corporate tax avoidance and a broad consen-
sus that more corporate tax revenues are needed at a time of widespread
recession and austerity.  Thus, lobbying in favor of a multilateral approach
is likely to push the OECD in the right direction.
But what if such lobbying fails?  In that case, I think the best way for-
ward is unilateral U.S. action.  The precedent is the adoption of the CFC
rules, which proves (among other examples) that such action can be both
possible and effective in pushing other countries to adopt similar rules.79
Before 1961, no country taxed the foreign source income of its multina-
tionals’ subsidiaries, because residence countries believed they lacked
both source and residence jurisdiction over foreign corporations’ foreign
source income.80  However, in 1961 the Kennedy administration proposed
taxing all income of “controlled foreign corporations” (CFCs) by using a
deemed dividend mechanism derived from the FPHC rules.81
While this proposal was rejected,82 the resulting compromise (Subpart
F, 1962) aimed at taxing income of CFCs that was unlikely to be taxed by
source countries, because it was either mobile and could be earned any-
where (passive income) or structured to be earned in low-tax jurisdictions
(base company income).
Initially, the adoption of Subpart F seemed to have put U.S.-based
multinationals at a competitive disadvantage, because no other country
had such rules.  But gradually this picture changed.83  The U.S. was fol-
lowed by Germany (1972), Canada (1975), Japan (1978), France (1980),
United Kingdom (1984), New Zealand (1988), Australia (1990), Sweden
(1990), Norway (1992), Denmark (1995), Finland (1995), Indonesia (1995),
Portugal (1995), Spain (1995), Hungary (1997), Mexico (1997), South Af-
77. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Gil Savir, Find It and Tax It: From TIEAs to
IGAs (Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 443, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2567646.
78. Jurisdictions Participating in the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance
in Tax Matters, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), http://www.oecd.org/
tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
79. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Constructive Unilateralism: US Leadership and In-
ternational Taxation (Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 463, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2567646.
80. See AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
81. President’s Tax Message, supra note 30, at 192.
82. Revenue Act of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 10650, supra note 42, at 4816-20, 4793-97;
see also Arm’s Length, supra note 32, at 102.
83. See HUGH AULT AND BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 474–86 (Kluwer Law International ed. 3d ed. 2010).
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rica (1997), South Korea (1997), Argentina (1999), Brazil (2000), Italy
(2000), Estonia (2000), Israel (2003), Turkey (2006), and China (2008).
Many other countries, such as India, are considering adopting such rules.
As a result, most of our trading partners now have CFC rules.
Moreover, the later adopters improved on the U.S. in two principal
ways.84 First, they rejected the deemed dividend mechanism, which can
lead to many unforeseen complications, in favor of taxing the shareholders
on a pass-through basis. Second, they generally explicitly incorporate the
effective foreign tax rate into the determination whether a CFC will be
subject to current tax. This is better than the U.S. rule that is based solely
on the type of income, because after 1980 it became quite easy to earn
active income that is not subject to tax.
The result is that the CFCs of EU-based multinationals are currently
generally subject to tax at similar or higher rates than U.S.-based ones,
despite the non-taxation of dividends from active income under territorial-
ity.85 This is therefore a classic example of constructive unilateralism. The
U.S. led and others followed, and the end result is that most multinationals
are subject to similar effective tax rates, with no competitive disadvantage
or advantage.  The result is a world in which there is much less double
non-taxation than in the absence of CFC rules.
Unfortunately, in the U.S., Subpart F has been critically undermined
by the adoption of check-the-box86 and the CFC-to-CFC exception, result-
ing in $2 trillion of low-taxed accumulated earnings offshore by U.S. mul-
tinationals.87  This cannot happen in other countries with tougher CFC
rules, and is a major part of the explanation why, despite rampant tax
competition, most OECD members did not see the sharp drops in overall
corporate tax revenues that are seen in developing countries.
The main argument in favor of territoriality (i.e, exempting dividends
paid by U.S. CFCs from tax upon receipt by their parents) is the lock-out
problem.88  About $2 trillion in low-taxed foreign source income are in
CFCs that cannot repatriate them because of the thirty-five percent tax on
repatriations and the absence of foreign tax credits.89  We know this is a
84. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Deemed Dividend Problem, 4 J. TAX. GLOBAL
TRANSACTIONS 33 (2004).
85. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest
US and EU Multinationals, 65 TAX L. REV. 375 (2012).
86. I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-6 C.B. 18; see also I.R.S. Notice 98-35, 1998-27 C.B. 35;
Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbi-
trage, 44 B.C.L. REV. 79 (2002).
87. REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, DIANE RING, & YARIV BRAUNER, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2011).
88. HUFBAUER & ASSA, supra note 44, at 143; see also HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN
MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME: DIVIDEND EXEMPTION VERSUS THE
CURRENT SYSTEM (2001).
89. Back to the Future, supra note 24, at 8.
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real problem because of the effectiveness of the 2004-2005 amnesty90 and
because of various attempts by multinationals to avoid the rule (e.g., via
inversions, “killer Bs,” short-term loans, etc.).
But it is less clear that the solution is a participation exemption.  Why
not abolish deferral and let the dividends flow back tax-free?
I would argue that this is a good opportunity for “constructive unilater-
alism.”91  No G20 country has a corporate tax rate below twenty per-
cent.92  If we reduced the corporate tax to, say, twenty-eight percent, and
at the same time abolished deferral, the likely response by other G20
members like Germany or France would be to follow suit.  They need the
extra revenue more than we do, and concerns about competitiveness
would be alleviated by the U.S. move, like they were in the original CFC
context.
It should be remembered that the other G20 countries have more ef-
fective CFC rules than the United State has, and those CFC rules already
act as a de facto worldwide system with a minimum tax: if the foreign tax is
below a set level (e.g., 25% in Germany or 20% in Japan), the CFC rules
kick in to tax the income.93  The result is that there is much less lock out
because most low-taxed foreign income is taxed by the CFC rules.  The
change to a worldwide system would be much less radical than usually
envisaged.  This is why for both the UK and Japan there was no significant
increase in repatriations after they adopted territoriality in 2009.
Should the U.S. adopt a lower tax on foreign source income (though
not necessarily the minimum tax) in order to remain competitive?  This is
what both the Obama and Camp proposals envisage.  Obama94 suggests a
28% corporate tax on domestic profits and a 19% tax on foreign income,
while Camp95 proposed a 25% tax on domestic profits and a 12.5- to 15%
tax on foreign income.
The problem, of course, is that such a gap would still encourage U.S.-
based MNEs to shift profits overseas, with no repatriation tax to deter
them.  We can always fall back to such a system if needed,96 but for now I
would suggest taxing all income at the same rate, and if that rate has to be
lower, so be it.  As long as it is above 20% I do not think we will be
90. See Flow of Fund Accounts of the United States, FED. RES. (Sept. 21, 2005), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20050921/accessible/f7.htm.
91. See National Regulation, supra note 74.
92. The UK has announced its intention to go to 18%, but this can be reversed if other
countries are willing to coordinate.
93. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Nicola Sartori, International Taxation and Competi-
tiveness: Foreword, 65 TAX L. REV 313 (2012)
94. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All or Nothing? The Obama Budget Proposals and BEPS 41
INT’L TAX J. 17–18, 75–76 (2015).
95. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Devil in the Details: Reflections on the Camp Draft, 73
TAX NOTES INT’L 1054, 1055 (2014).
96. REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TAX
LAW (2015).
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outside G20 norms, and a rate in the 20- to 25% range will not put our
MNEs at a significant competitive disadvantage given the effective mini-
mum tax imposed by the CFC rules of our trading partners.
It is impossible to predict what will happen, but the history described
above suggests that there is a good chance that other G20 countries will
follow us if we abolish deferral at a lower rate.  And if that happens, all the
usual objections to worldwide taxation (competitiveness, inversions, and
the various neutralities) lose their force.  I do not think there is a signifi-
cant risk involved in this move, and the potential upside is quite large.
But, it will be argued, why not begin with the multilateral approach,
which seems to better fit twenty-first century multipolar realities than uni-
lateral action by the decreasingly hegemonic U.S.?
The problem is that there is not a good example of multilateralism
working in tax matters.  Both the MAATM and BEPS are very much
works in progress.  In my opinion, MAATM has potential as a deterrence
device, and BEPS, while imperfect, has achieved some meaningful pro-
gress, especially in the treaty context.  But change comes slowly, and for
now I believe that constructive unilateralism is still the most promising
way forward.
In the end, we should remember what our normative goals are.  I be-
lieve that the individual income tax is necessary to achieve redistribu-
tion97, and for that to happen each residence country should be able to
effectively tax its individual residents on a global basis at its domestic rate
structure.  I also believe that the corporate tax is necessary to regulate
corporate behavior,98 and that corporations should be subject to tax on a
global basis at a rate that represents the current consensus for corporate
tax rates at source (in the 20 to 30% range).  Those have been the norma-
tive goals of the international tax regime since its inception close to a hun-
dred years ago, and the above has been an attempt to suggest some ways
to move it forward into its second century.99
97. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive
Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391, 1403–13 (2002) (arguing in support of additional justifications
for redistributive taxation of rich).
98. Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1193–255.
99. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax Regime: A Centennial Reconsideration
(Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 462, 2015) (not-
ing that updating the international tax regime may involve reconsidering the traditional pref-
erence for residence taxation of passive income and source taxation of active income).
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APPENDIX:
CAN CORPORATE TAX RATES BE COORDINATED?
In 1980, Thomas Horst published an extremely influential and widely
cited article in which he demonstrated that under certain assumptions it is
impossible to simultaneously obtain capital export neutrality (CEN) and
capital import neutrality (CIN).100 CEN refers to neutrality of investment
decisions between the country in which an investor resides and the country
in which she is considering making an investment.  CIN refers to treating
all investors in a given country in the same way.
For example, suppose that A is a resident of country X and B is a
resident of country Y, and they are both considering making an invest-
ment of 1,000 in country Z.  Country X has a tax rate of thirty-five percent,
country Y has a tax rate of twenty-five percent, and country Z has a tax
rate of zero percent.
CEN would require both country X and country Y to impose their tax
on any investment A or B make.  This would result in A being taxed at
35% whether he invests in X or in Z, and B would be taxed at 25%
whether she invests in Y or in Z.  But this result violates CIN because A
and B will bear different rates on their investment in Z.
CIN would require both X and Y to exempt foreign source income.
This would preserve CIN because they would each bear only the Z rate
(zero) on their investment in Z.  But both A and B would have an incen-
tive to invest in Z rather than in their home countries, which violates
CEN.
Horst pointed out that CEN and CIN can only be attained at the same
time on one assumption: that the X and Y rates are the same.  In that case,
both X and Y can tax their investors on the investment in Z, but because
the rates are the same neither CEN nor CIN would be violated.
Horst assumed that this result is unrealistic, and he was right in 1980.
But is he still right?  I am less sure of that, as far as corporate taxes are
concerned.
Countries vary tremendously in terms of their individual income tax
rates.  In the OECD, these range from 16.5% (Slovakia) to 56.6% (Swe-
den).  This is understandable because the personal income tax is about the
degree of progressivity that countries desire and there is tremendous vari-
ation of opinion on how much progressivity is desirable.
But there is considerably less variation in corporate tax rates in the
OECD.  The lowest is Ireland at 12.5% and the highest is the U.S. at
39.1% (including state corporate taxes), but out of thirty-seven OECD
countries, twenty-five have a corporate rate between 20% and 30% and
100. Thomas Horst, A Note on Optional Taxation of International Investment Income,
94 Q.J. ECON. 793 (1980).
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this includes all the large OECD economies except for France, Italy, and
the U.S.101
Why is there such convergence of corporate tax rates?  Fundamentally,
because of tax competition.  Multinationals compete with each other
across national borders, and no country wishes to put its multinationals at
a competitive disadvantage.  Because of this, corporate tax rates tend to
move in unison.  When the U.S. reduced its rate from 46% to 35% in 1986,
most countries followed suit, so that the typical corporate tax rate in the
1990s was in the thirty-percent range.  Then, in the 2000s, most large
OECD countries except the U.S. reduced their rate to the twenty-percent
range, led by Germany and eventually followed by the UK and Japan.
This dynamic can be seen in the current pressure on the U.S. to reduce its
corporate rate below 30%, which is supported by the Obama administra-
tion and both Democrats and Republicans in Congress precisely because
the U.S. now has the highest corporate rate in the OECD.102
There are, of course, outliers with rates below 20%, such as Ireland,
but those are typically small countries with a narrow domestic corporate
base, so their low rate is primarily a device to attract FDI without running
afoul of the OECD and EU limits on harmful tax competition, which pre-
clude granting tax reductions only to foreign MNEs.103
In this situation, one could argue that for the vast majority of MNEs,
which are overwhelmingly based in the large OECD countries, the
counterfactual to Horst’s assumption that tax rates cannot be coordinated
has already occurred.  Therefore, these countries can apply their tax rates
to their multinationals’ worldwide income without violating CEN or CIN,
as proposed above.
But I think the current BEPS project gives us a chance to go further.
The EU has never succeeded in coordinating corporate tax rates within it
despite various attempts to do so, because EU membership is too diverse.
The same can be said even more strongly of the OECD and a fortiori the
UN.  But the G20, which is driving the BEPS effort, is another matter.
These are all very large capital exporting economies, and they are home to
over ninety percent of the world’s multinationals.  If the G20 wanted to,
they could plausibly commit to taxing their MNEs on worldwide income at
a rate that is between twenty percent and thirty percent.  No G20 member
would be required to raise its current rate and only six would have to
reduce their rate (Argentina, Brazil, France, Italy, India, and the U.S.).104
101. See Avi-Yonah & Lahav, supra note 45 (stating that while these are nominal (statu-
tory) rates, the empirical evidence indicates the same convergence in effective rates as well).
102. See Reuvin S. Avi-Yonah and Omri Y. Marian, Inversions and Competitiveness:
Reflections in the Wake of Pfizer-Allergan, 41 INT’L TAX J. 39 (2015).
103. See Reuvin S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Retro-
spective After a Decade, 34 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 783 (2009).
104. In fact, it would be sufficient if the G20 were to commit not to reduce rates below
20%, because tax competition would eventually lead the outliers to reduce rates below 30%.
This means that no actual rate changes need to be made at all.
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Thus, Horst’s utopian world of coordinated tax rates which enable both
CEN and CIN to be achieved simultaneously may be closer to reality than
many economists and policymakers have assumed.
